



#### In Opposition to Vermont H. 266

Position: The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") respectfully opposes Vermont H. 266. H. 266 would require biopharmaceutical manufacturers to ship 340B drugs to all pharmacies that contract with 340B "covered entities" and by extension offer 340B pricing at these locations. This type of provision not only raises constitutional concerns but also exacerbates existing problems with the 340B program without ensuring that vulnerable patients needing discounted medicines will benefit.

Congress created the 340B program in 1992 to help vulnerable and uninsured patients directly access prescription medicines at safety-net facilities. H. 266 is a state 340B contract pharmacy mandate. Contract pharmacy mandates do not help patients better afford their medicines or improve patient access.

There is no requirement that a contract pharmacy pass along the reduced price of a medicine to a patient, and analysis shows this is not happening. The arrangement between a covered entity and contract pharmacy is confidential. But according to available information, contract pharmacies retained 9% of the \$64 billion in 340B profits generated in 2023—for a total of \$5.76 billion. Between 2013-2023, the share of 340B margin retained by contract pharmacies tripled. The average profit margin for non-340B medicines dispensed through non-340B pharmacies is 3-4%, while 340B medicines dispensed through contract pharmacies is 72%.

The potential for a pharmacy to contract with a covered entity does not impact a patient's ability to access their medicines. A pharmacy's status as a "contract pharmacy" has no impact on whether or not a patient can pick up their prescriptions.

## There is little evidence to suggest that patients have benefited from contract pharmacy growth.

Since 2010, the number of contracts with pharmacies has grown by more than 12,000%, and between 2013 and 2024, over 200,000 contract pharmacy agreements were established. Because the program has no transparency or guardrails on how hospitals and clinics use 340B profits, the money often is not going to help low-income and uninsured patients access medicines. An analysis of contract pharmacy claims for brand medicines only found evidence that patients were directly receiving a discount for 1.4% of prescriptions eligible for 340B.

A traditional retail pharmacy contracted with a covered entity is, on average, 46 miles away from the covered entity. Additional studies have found that 65% of the roughly 3,000 hospitals that

participate in the 340B program are not located in medically underserved areas, if and in Vermont, 66% of contract pharmacies are located in rural areas despite 85% of the state's zip codes being considered rural. Research has also found that more than 77% of 340B hospitals provide less charity care than the national average for all hospitals, and they often spend less on charity care and community investment than the estimated value of their tax breaks as nonprofits.

## A lack of transparency and oversight has led to abuse of the 340B program.

Through the program, biopharmaceutical manufacturers provided \$66.3 billion in medicines at significantly reduced prices in 2023 to qualifying safety-net hospitals and certain clinics ("covered entities"), xi but patients are often not benefitting. Today, large hospital systems, chain pharmacies, and pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are exploiting the 340B program by marking up medicines for profit—even though its intended beneficiaries were true safety-net hospitals and clinics and the low-income and vulnerable patients they treat. The 340B program has strayed far from its safety-net purpose, and Congress needs to fix the program to ensure that it is reaching its intended populations.

## The 340B program has become a hidden tax on employers and their workers.

Marking up the costs of 340B medicines for employer-sponsored commercial plans and patients with private insurance generates significant revenue for 340B hospitals. 340B hospitals collect 7 times as much as independent physician offices for the sale of medicines administered to commercially insured patients<sup>xii</sup> and average spending per patient in the commercial market on outpatient medicines was more than 2.5 times higher at 340B hospitals than non-340B hospitals.<sup>xiii</sup>

The current design of the program directly increases costs for employers by an estimated 4.2%, or \$5.2 billion, xiv due to foregone rebates from manufacturers (which reduce the price of medicine), and indirectly increases employer costs by incentivizing provider consolidation and use of higher cost medicines. XV Employers in Vermont pay an estimated \$43.9 million more in health care costs due to forgone rebates as a result of the 340B program. XVI This leads to a \$1.1 million reduction in state and local tax revenue. XVII

With no obligation to invest profits from 340B markups at satellite facilities into underserved communities, 340B hospitals frequently purchase independent physician offices so they can then buy more medicines and increase their 340B profits. Further, incentives in the 340B program increase the use of higher-cost medicines as hospitals participating in 340B generally obtain substantially larger profits from more expensive medicines. Xix,XXX

# The 340B program has fiscal implications for state employees and ultimately taxpayers. Contract pharmacy mandates like H. 266 increase that fiscal impact.

In an unprecedented report examining 340B hospital practices in its state, the North Carolina State Treasurer found North Carolina 340B hospitals charged state employees massive markups for oncology medicines. According to the report, North Carolina 340B hospitals charged state

employees, on average, a price markup of 5.4 times the hospitals' discounted 340B acquisition cost for outpatient infused cancer medicines. This resulted in billing the North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees a price markup on cancer medicines that was 84.8% higher than North Carolina hospitals outside of the 340B program.\*\*

A 2025 fiscal analysis of Utah Senate Bill 69, legislation similar to H.266, estimates a state 340B contract pharmacy mandate would result in an estimated cost increase of \$2.0 million per year to the Utah Public Employees Health Plan.xxiii The estimated fiscal impact on education and local government entities in Utah is \$3.1 million annually.xxiii

Proposed contract pharmacy legislation in Vermont is estimated to increase health care costs for employers and state and local governments by \$20.8 million due to additional foregone rebates.\*\*

### H. 266 will line the pockets of PBMs, pharmacy chains, and large hospital systems.

Many contract pharmacies charge a patient based on a drug's full retail price because they are not required to share any of the discount with those in need. \*\* Big-box retailers such as Walgreens, CVS Health, and Walmart are major participants in the 340B program through contract pharmacy arrangements. Because of vertical integration in the supply chain, PBMs now own the vast majority of pharmacies, meaning they also make a profit from contract pharmacy arrangements. In fact, the five largest for-profit pharmacy chains comprise 60% of 340B contract pharmacies, but only 35% of all pharmacies nationwide. \*\*\* 340B covered entities and their contract pharmacies generated an estimated \$13 billion in gross profits on 340B purchased medicines in 2018, which represents more than 25% of pharmacies' and providers' total profits from dispensing or administering brand medicines. \*\*\*xviii\* The program reached \$66.3 billion, a 23% growth increase from the previous year. \*\*\*xviii\*\*

In 2023, the Minnesota Legislature passed legislation xxix that requires the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) to collect and aggregate data from Minnesota providers that participate in the federal 340B program. The Minnesota 340B report provides further evidence that for-profit middlemen are profiting from the 340B program. Payments to contract pharmacies and third-party administrators (TPAs) were over \$120 million, representing approximately \$16 of every \$100 of gross 340B revenue generated paid to external parties. In fact, 10% of safety-net federal grantees reported a negative net 340B revenue due to payments made to middlemen. The top 10% of critical access hospitals and disease-specific grantees with the highest external operational costs lost at least half their gross 340B revenue to TPAs and contract pharmacies. xxx

The Minnesota 340B report also sheds light on the massive profits 340B tax-exempt hospitals retain from the 340B program. Minnesota providers participating in the 340B program earned a collective net\*xxi 340B revenue of at least \$630 million for the 2023 calendar year. Based on national data, MDH believes this figure may represent as little as half to one-third of the actual total 340B revenue for Minnesota providers due to lack of reporting from the covered entities for office administered drugs. Most entities did not report data for office administered drugs, which are estimated to account for 80% of all 340B drug spending. The state's largest 340B hospitals benefitted most from the 340B program,

accounting for 13% of reporting entities but representing 80%—more than \$500 million—of net 340B revenue.xxxiv

# The 340B program is a comprehensive federal program that is governed exclusively by federal law.

States do not have the authority to create new requirements that are not in the federal statute or that conflict with the statute. Whether manufacturers can be required to ship drugs to contract pharmacies for 340B providers is currently being litigated in multiple federal courts across the country.

Whether manufacturers can be required to ship drugs to contract pharmacies for 340B providers is currently being litigated in several federal courts across the country. In litigation about the federal 340B statute, U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third Circuit and D.C. Circuit have specifically found that the federal statute does not require delivery to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies.

In January 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "[s]ection 340B [of the federal statute] does not require delivery to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies" and "Congress never said that drug makers must deliver discounted Section 340B drugs to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies." Sanofi Aventis U.S. LLC v. United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 58 F.4th 696 (3d Cir. 2023).

In May 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit similarly held that manufacturers are not required to deliver to an unlimited number of contract pharmacies. Slip. Op. at 12, *Novartis Pharms*. *Corp. v. Johnson*, Nos. 21-5299, 21-5304 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2024).

Despite ongoing activity at the federal level and in federal courts, a number of states have enacted legislation similar to H. 266 that has serious constitutional defects and is being challenged in court. In December 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia enjoined one of those laws after finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the law was preempted by federal law.

# PhRMA respectfully opposes the provisions outlined above and appreciates your consideration prior to advancing H. 266.

\*\*\*\*

The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) represents the country's leading innovative biopharmaceutical research companies, which are laser focused on developing innovative medicines that transform lives and create a healthier world. Together, we are fighting for solutions to ensure patients can access and afford medicines that prevent, treat and cure disease. Over the last decade, PhRMA member companies have invested more than \$800 billion in the search for new treatments and cures, and they support nearly five million jobs in the United States.

- <sup>1</sup> 340B Industry Roundtable, "For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program: 2025 Update," Jan. 2025. https://roundtable.thinkmosaic.com/links/for profit phcy 340b 2025 update
- Berkeley Research Group, "The Pharmaceutical Supply Chain: 2013-2023," Jan. 2025.
- https://www.thinkbrg.com/insights/publications/the-pharmaceutical-supply-chain-2013-2023/.
- iii Ibid.
- iv Berkeley Research Group, "For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program: 2025 Update," Jan. 2025. https://roundtable.thinkmosaic.com/links/for\_profit\_phcy\_340b\_2025\_update
- VIQVIA. "Are Discounts in the 340B Drug Discount Program Being Shared with Patients at Contract Pharmacies." Oct. 10, 2022. Access: https://www.iqvia.com/locations/united-states/library/fact-sheets/are-discounts-in-the-340b-drug-discount-program-being-shared-with-patients-at-contract-pharmacies.
- vi 340B Industry Roundtable, "For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program: 2025 Update," Jan. 2025. https://roundtable.thinkmosaic.com/links/for profit phcy 340b 2025 update.
- vii Alliance for Integrity & Reform. "340B A Missed Opportunity to Address Those That Are Medically Underserved." 2023 Update. Access: https://340breform.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/340B\_MUA\_July23-4.pdf.
- viii Rural urban commuting area codes values: U.S. Department of Agriculture, ZIP code file for the 2010 Rural-Urban Commuting Area Codes, last updated Aug. 17, 2020.
- http://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/\_laserfiche/DataFiles/53241/RUCA2010zipcode.xlsx?v=21936
- ix Zip Code Vulnerability: Vizient Vulnerability Index, accessed Jan. 2025. Vizient Vulnerability Index public access
- \* BRG Analysis of HRSA OPAIS Database and Medicare Cost Reports. Q1, 2024.
- xi HRSA, "2023 Covered Entity 340B Purchases," Oct. 2024. https://www.hrsa.gov/opa/updates/2023-340b-covered-entity-purchases.
- <sup>xii</sup> Hospital Prices for Physician-Administered Drugs for Patients with Private Insurance, New England Journal of Medicine, 390, 4, (338-335), (2024). DOI: 10.1056/NEJMsa2306609
- xiii Hunter MT, et al. "Analysis of 2020 Commercial Outpatient Drug Spend at 340B Participating Hospitals." Milliman, September 2022. https://www.milliman.com/-/media/milliman/pdfs/2022-articles/9-13-22\_phrma-340b-commercial-analysis.ashx
- xiv Sun C, Zeng S, Martin R. "The Cost of the 340B Program Part 1: Self-Insured Employers." *IQVIA*, March 2024. https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/us/white-paper/iqvia-cost-of-340b-part-1-white-paper-2024.pdf
- <sup>w</sup> Sun C, Zeng S, Martin R. "The Cost of the 340B Program Part 2: 340B Revenue Sharing." *IQVIA*, March 2024. https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/us/white-paper/2024/the-cost-of-the-340b-program-part-2-340b-revenue-sharing.pdf.
- xvi IQVIA, "The Cost of 340B to States," Feb. 2025. https://www.iqvia.com/locations/united-states/library/white-papers/the-cost-of-the-340b-program-to-states.
- xvii Magnolia Market Access, "How The 340B Program Impacts Federal & State Tax Liability," Jan.2025. https://www.magnoliamarketaccess.com/insight/how-the-340b-program-impacts-federal-state-tax-liability/
- <sup>xviii</sup> Desai and J.M. McWilliams, Consequences of the 340B Drug Pricing Program, New England Journal of Medicine, Feb. 2018, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejmsa1706475
- xix Conti R, Bach P. "Cost Consequences of the 340B Drug Discount Program," JAMA. 2013;309(19):1995-1996.
- \*\* Hirsch BR, Balu S, Schulman KA. "The Impact of Specialty Pharmaceuticals as Drivers of Health Care Costs," *Health Affairs*, 2014;33(10):1714-1720.
- North Carolina State Treasurer. "Overcharged: State Employees, Cancer Drugs, and the 340B Drug Pricing Program." May 2024. Access: https://www.shpnc.org/documents/overcharged-state-employees-cancer-drugs-and-340b-drug-price-program/download?attachment
- wdi Utah Senate Bill 69 Fiscal Note. 2025 General Session. https://le.utah.gov/~2025/bills/static/SB0069.html wdii Utah PEHP Senate Bill 69 Fiscal Impact.
- https://www.urs.org/documents/byfilename/@Public%20Web%20Documents@URS@External@FiscalNotes@PEHP@2025@SB69@@application@pdf/
- xxiv IQVIA, "The Cost of 340B to States," Feb. 2025. https://www.iqvia.com/locations/united-states/library/white-papers/the-cost-of-the-340b-program-to-states
- <sup>xw</sup> Conti, Rena M., and Peter B. Bach. "Cost consequences of the 340B drug discount program." *Jama* 309.19 (2013): 1995-1996.
- xwi Government Accountability Office, "Drug Discount Program: Federal Oversight of Compliance at 340B Contract Pharmacies Needs Improvement," GAO-18-480, June 2018.
- xxvii Berkeley Research Group. For-Profit Pharmacy Participation in the 340B Program. October 2020.
- xxviii Fein, Adam. The 340B Program Reached \$66 Billion in 2023—Up 23% vs. 2022: Analyzing the Numbers and HRSA's Curious Actions. Drug Channels. Oct. 22, 2024.
- https://www.drugchannels.net/2024/10/the-340b-program-reached-66-billion-in.html

xxix 2023 Minnesota Statutes, Section 62J.312

https://www.health.state.mn.us/data/340b/docs/2024report.pdf

- xxxi MDH defines "net" as the difference between the payments received for discounted drugs (\$1.5 billion), and the cost of acquiring those drugs (\$734 million) plus payments to external administrators (\$120 million). (see p.7)
- xxxii The Minnesota Legislature amended the transparency law in 2024 to explicitly require covered entities to report data for office-administered drugs. See 2024 Minnesota Statutes, Section 62J.461
- Spending in the 340B Drug Pricing Program, 2010 to 2021 (https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-06/60339-340B-DrugPricing-Program.pdf)
- xxxiv Minnesota Department of Public Health, "340B Covered Entity Report," Nov. 25, 2024.

https://www.health.state.mn.us/data/340b/docs/2024report.pdf

xxx Minnesota Department of Public Health, "340B Covered Entity Report," Nov. 25, 2024.