



MARYLAND ALL PAYER SYSTEM:
HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE

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
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OUTLINE

- History
- Structure
- Performance
- Tools
- S.W.O.T.Analysis
- Discussion

Background/Disclaimer

HISTORY OF PAYMENT REFORM IN MARYLAND



The Maryland Experiment



IN MARYLAND...THINGS ARE DIFFERENT




All-Payer hospital rate setting system since 1977

- Maryland has set hospital rates since the mid-1970s
 - **H** **e** **a** **l** **t** **h** **S** **e** **r** **v** **i** **c** **e** **s** **C** **o** **s** **t** **R** **e** **v** **i** **e** **w** **C** **o** **m** **m** **i** **s** **s** **i** **o**
 - Independent 7- member Commission
 - Public utility model
 - Serves as watchdog and regulator
- Maryland hospitals are waived from Federal Medicare payment methods
 - Hence – The Medicare waiver)
- All payers participate
- Unique in the country

VALUE OF THE ALL-PAYER SYSTEM

- ▶ Cost containment for the public
- ▶ Equitable funding of uncompensated care
- ▶ Stable and predictable payment system for hospitals
- ▶ All payers fund GME
- ▶ Transparency
- ▶ Leader in linking quality and payment
- ▶ Local access to regulators
- ▶ Avoids cost shifting across payers

WHY START WITH HOSPITALS?





All Other Costs,

- ▶ ~75%+ of Medicare expenditures are tied to a hospitalization
 - ▶ Hospitals ~56%
 - ▶ Post-acute ~12%
 - ▶ Facility related physician fees ~10%
- ▶ Importance of Medicare waiver

2015 Maryland Medicare Dollar %

TIMELINE





Legend

- HSCRC – Health Services Cost Review Commission
- MDH – Maryland Department of Health
- MHCC – Maryland Health Care Commission
- MIA – Maryland Insurance Administration
- CRISP – Chesapeake Regional Information System for our Patients
- MCHE – Maryland Commission on Health Equity

HSCRC TOOLS

- Rate setting
- Annual Update
 - Inflation
 - Quality Performance
 - Compliance to Global Budget/MPA
 - Volume
 - Demographic
 - Market shift
 - Other
 - Integrated Efficiency
 - Revenue for Reform

PERFORMANCE

Mathematica, Inc.,
 Evaluation of the
 Maryland Total Cost
 of Care Model:
 Progress Report.
 April 2024


Exhibit ES.3. The model reduced Medicare spending and service use during the MD TCOC period (2019 to 2022), with effects that were generally larger than those at the end of the MDAPM period

Outcome	Favorable direction of effect ^b	Average annual percentage impact of the Maryland Model ^a		Difference ^c
		During the last two years of the MDAPM period (2017 to 2018)	During the MD TCOC period (2019 to 2022)	
Medicare FFS spending				
Total Medicare FFS spending (Part A and B)	↓	-1.1%*	-2.1%**	-1.0pp**
Total Medicare FFS spending + non-claims payments ^c	↓	-1.3%**	-2.2%**	-0.9pp**
Hospital spending (inpatient and outpatient)	↓	-4.7%**	-6.1%**	-1.4pp**
Non-hospital spending	↓ or ↑*	3.6%**	3.1%**	-0.5pp
Service use and quality of care				
All-cause acute care hospital admissions	↓	-10.6%**	-16.2%**	-5.6pp**
Outpatient ED visits and observation stays	↓	-2.8%**	-5.9%**	-3.1pp**
Intensity of hospital care (measured by standardized hospital spending) ^d	↓	-4.6%**	-8.0%**	-3.4pp**
Potentially preventable admissions	↓	-9.9%**	-16.8%**	-6.9pp**
30-day post-discharge unplanned readmission	↓	-7.9%**	-8.9%**	-1.0pp*
Timely follow-up after acute exacerbation of chronic conditions	↑	2.2%**	2.6%**	0.4pp
Patient experience				
Patients' rating of their personal doctor	↑	0.10%	0.30%	0.2pp
Patients' rating of their hospital ^e	↑	1.50%	0.70%	-0.8pp
Medicare Diabetes Prevention Program				
Use of Diabetes Prevention Program services ^f	↑	Not shown ^g	Not shown ^g	Not shown ^g

PERFORMANCE

[Mathematica, Inc.,
Evaluation of the
Maryland Total Cost
of Care Model:
Progress Report.
April 2024](#)

Exhibit ES.1. All-payer hospital global budgets, the Maryland Primary Care Program, and quality adjustments to hospital budgets were the largest potential drivers of change in the MD TCOC Model in 2022, as measured by the statewide size of the incentive or investment



^a Hospitals that exceeded volumes built into their global budgets had negative retained revenue.

B = billion; FFS = fee-for-service; M = million.

FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE

**Create results of a well-organized
pre-payment model
without capitated payment**

S.W.O.T ANALYSIS

	+	-
Internal	Strengths	Weaknesses
External	Opportunities	Threats

STRENGTHS

- Longevity
- Infrastructure
- All Payer
- CRISP
- Results in TCOC/Readmissions
- Political support
- Covid-19

WEAKNESSES

- Complex system/Difficult to replicate
- Volume policies
- Retained revenue
- Slow to respond
- Lack of Planning – Capacity imbalance
- Physician alignment
- ED wait times

OPPORTUNITIES

- Improved alignment across payers/providers
- Medicaid MDPCP
- More delivery system reform
- Improved Incentives
- Use savings to innovate

THREATS

- Uncertainty in Washington
- Political changes

DISCUSSION

